David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Brian Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2006)
Is the Introspection Thesis true? It certainly isn’t obvious. Introspection is the faculty by which each of us has access to his or her own mental states. Even if we were to suppose that mental states are identical to brain states, it doesn’t follow immediately from this supposition that we can introspect our mental states as brain states. This point is analogous to the following. It doesn’t follow immediately from the mere fact that some distant object is identical to a horse that we can perceive it as a horse. Further, it isn’t obvious that any amount of education would suffice to make some distant speck on the horizon seem like a horse. It may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that some distant speck is a horse; as long as we are sufficiently distant from it we will only be able to see it as a speck. Analogously then, it may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that our mental states are brain states, we will only be able to introspect them as irreducibly mental
|Keywords||Experience Introspection Materialism Metaphysics Churchland, Paul M|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Pete Mandik (2012). Color-Consciousness Conceptualism. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.
Carl B. Sachs (2014). Discursive and Somatic Intentionality: Merleau-Ponty Contra 'McDowell or Sellars'. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (2):199-227.
Similar books and articles
Natika Newton (1988). Introspection and Perception. Topoi 7 (March):25-30.
Lynne Rudder Baker (1994). Attitudes as Nonentities. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):175-203.
Robert C. Coburn (1963). Shaffer on the Identity of Mental States and Brain Processes. Journal of Philosophy 60 (February):89-92.
Sydney Shoemaker (1994). The Mind-Body Problem. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell
Paul M. Churchland (1985). Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Introspection of Brain States. Journal of Philosophy 82 (January):8-28.
Jose S. Pescador Hierro (1997). Problemas del empirismo en la filosofía de la mente. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):35-49.
Jerome A. Shaffer (1961). Could Mental States Be Brain Processes? Journal of Philosophy 58 (December):813-22.
Kurt Baier (1962). Smart on Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40 (May):57-68.
Natika Newton (1986). Churchland on Direct Introspection of Brain States. Analysis 46 (March):97-102.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads60 ( #67,710 of 1,790,225 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #427,637 of 1,790,225 )
How can I increase my downloads?