|Abstract||We don’t need science in order to know that we are conscious or aware. But science suggests that we are conscious largely due to our brains. And science perhaps further suggests that our conscious states are identical to certain states of our brains. This later idea—that conscious states just are certain brain states (hereafter, the Identity Thesis)—is the main aim of this book to defend.|
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|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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