When best theories go bad

Abstract
It is common for contemporary metaphysical realists to adopt Quine's criterion of ontological commitment while at the same time repudiating his ontological pragmatism. 2 Drawing heavily from the work of others—especially Joseph Melia and Stephen Yablo—I will argue that the resulting approach to meta-ontology is unstable. In particular, if we are metaphysical realists, we need not accept ontological commitment to whatever is quantified over by our best first-order theories.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00248.x
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References found in this work BETA
Willard V. O. Quine (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Stephen Yablo (2005). The Myth of Seven. In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Clarendon Press 88--115.

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