When Best Theories Go Bad

It is common for contemporary metaphysical realists to adopt Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment while at the same time repudiating his ontological pragmatism. Drawing heavily from the work of others--especially Joseph Melia and Stephen Yablo--I will argue that the resulting approach to metaontology is unstable. In particular, if we are metaphysical realists, we need not accept ontological commitment to whatever is quantified over by our best first-order theories
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00248.x
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References found in this work BETA
Willard V. O. Quine (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Stephen Yablo (2005). The Myth of the Seven. In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Clarendon Press 88--115.

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