David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):98-117 (2011)
Abstract: “Consciousness” seems to be a polysemic, ambiguous, term. Because of this, theorists have sought to distinguish the different kinds of phenomena that “consciousness” denotes, leading to a proliferation of terms for different kinds of consciousness. However, some philosophers—univocalists about consciousness—argue that “consciousness” is not polysemic or ambiguous. By drawing upon the history of philosophy and psychology, and some resources from semantic theory, univocalism about consciousness is shown to be implausible. This finding is important, for if we accept the univocalist account then we are less likely to subject our thought and talk about the mind to the kind of critical analysis that it needs. The exploration of the semantics of “consciousness” offered here, by way of contrast, clarifies and fine-tunes our thought and talk about consciousness and conscious mentality and explains why “consciousness” means what it does, and why it means a number of different, but related, things
|Keywords||unconscious mind concept of consciousness state consciousness history of psychology consciousness theories of consciousness|
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Reid (2002/1971). Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Pennsylvania State University Press.
John Locke (2008/1995). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford University Press.
Thomas Reid (2002). Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Pennsylvania State University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Neil C. Manson (2012). First-Person Authority: An Epistemic-Pragmatic Account. Mind and Language 27 (2):181-199.
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