Why Shouldn't Insurance Companies Know Your Genetic Information?

Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (Supplement):345-356 (2007)
Abstract
In this paper I state and reject two of the most commonly given arguments for regulating access by insurance companies to the results of genetic tests. I then argue that since we cannot assume a priori that those genetically predisposed to disease will have worse health outcomes than those not so disposed, we cannot know a priori that genetic discrimination will emerge as a major problem in a free market health insurance system. Finally, I explore the possibility of a free-market solution to the problem of genetic discrimination:genetic insurance
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Cormac Nagle (2010). Genetic Testing and Insurance. Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin 15 (4):9.
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