Agent causation as the solution to all the compatibilist's problems

Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383 - 398 (2012)
Abstract
In a recent paper I argued that agent causation theorists should be compatibilists. In this paper, I argue that compatibilists should be agent causation theorists. I consider six of the main problems facing compatibilism: (i) the powerful intuition that one can't be responsible for actions that were somehow determined before one was born; (ii) Peter van Inwagen's modal argument, involving the inference rule (β); (iii) the objection to compatibilism that is based on claiming that the ability to do otherwise is a necessary condition for freedom; (iv) "manipulation arguments," involving cases in which an agent is manipulated by some powerful being into doing something that he or she would not normally do, but in such a way that the compatibilist's favorite conditions for a free action are satisfied; (v) the problem of constitutive luck; and (vi) the claim that it is not fair to blame someone for an action if that person was determined by forces outside of his or her control to perform that action. And in the case of each of these problems, I argue that the compatibilist has a much more plausible response to that problem if she endorses the theory of agent causation than she does otherwise
Keywords Freedom and determinism  Compatibilism  Agent causation  Compatibilist version of the theory of agent causation  ComTac
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    References found in this work BETA
    John Martin Fischer (1983). Incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 43 (1):127 - 137.

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