A Defence of Presentism

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1 (3):47-82 (2004)
Abstract
∗ Apologies to Mark Hinchliff for stealing the title of his dissertation. (See Hinchliff, A Defense of Presentism. As it turns out, however, the version of Presentism defended here is different from the version defended by Hinchliff. See Section 3.1 below.).
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    Ben Caplan & David Sanson (2010). The Way Things Were. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):24-39.
    Alex Baia (2012). Presentism and the Grounding of Truth. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):341-356.

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