David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studia Logica 100 (4):727-751 (2012)
So-called 'dynamic' semantic theories such as Kamp's discourse representation theory and Heim's file change semantics account for such phenomena as cross-sentential anaphora, donkey anaphora, and the novelty condition on indefinites, but compare unfavorably with Montague semantics in some important respects (clarity and simplicity of mathematical foundations, compositionality, handling of quantification and coordination). Preliminary efforts have been made by Muskens and by de Groote to revise and extend Montague semantics to cover dynamic phenomena. We present a new higher-order theory of discourse semantics which improves on their accounts by incorporating a more articulated notion of context inspired by ideas due to David Lewis and to Craige Roberts. On our account, a context consists of a common ground of mutually accepted propositions together with a set of discourse referents preordered by relative salience. Employing a richer notion of contexts enables us to extend our coverage beyond pronominal anaphora to a wider range of presuppositional phenomena, such as the factivity of certain sentential-complement verbs, resolution of anaphora associated with arbitrarily complex definite descriptions, presupposition 'holes' such as negation, and the independence condition on the antecedents of conditionals. Formally, our theory is expressed within a higher-order logic with natural number type, separation-style subtyping, and dependent coproducts parameterized by the natural numbers. The system of semantic types builds on proposals due to Thomason and to Pollard in which the type of propositions (static meanings of sentential utterances) is taken as basic and worlds are constructed from propositions (rather than the other way around as in standard Montague semantics)
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Stalnaker (1973). Presuppositions. Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (4):447 - 457.
Craige Roberts (2003). Uniqueness in Definite Noun Phrases. Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (3):287-350.
H. Kamp (1981). A Theory of Truth and Semantic Representation, 277-322, JAG Groenendijk, TMV Janssen and MBJ Stokhof, Eds. In Jeroen Groenendijk (ed.), Formal Methods in the Study of Language. U of Amsterdam
J. Lambek & P. J. Scott (1989). Introduction to Higher Order Categorical Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (3):1113-1114.
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