An Objection to Attitudinal Hedonism

Philosophical Studies 115 (2):197 - 200 (2003)
Abstract This article argues that attitudinal hedonism is false as a theory of what is intrinsically good for us because it implies that nothing is intrinsically good for someone who does not have the psychological capacity for the propositional attitude of enjoyment even if he has other important mental capacities that humans have.
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