A possible Answer to Newman’s Objection from the perspective of informational structural realism

Revue Roumaine de Philosophie 59 (2):307-318 (2015)
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Abstract

This paper aims to reconstruct a possible answer to the classical Newman’s objection which has been used countless times to argue against structural realism. The reconstruction starts from the new strand of structural realism – informational structural realism – authored by Luciano Floridi. Newman’s objection had previously stated that all propositions which comprise the mathematical structures are merely trivial truths and can be instantiated by multiple models. This paper examines whether informational structural realism can overcome this objection by analysing the previous attempts to answer this objection, attempts which either try to save the Ramseyfication of mathematical propositions or give up on it. The informational structural realism way is to attempt a third way, the neo-Kantian way inspired by the work of Ernst Cassirer, but also to change the formalism from a mathematical to an informational one. This paper shows how this original combination of neo-Kantianism, informational formalism and the method of levels of abstraction provide the tools to overcome Newman’s objection.

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Lavinia Marin
Delft University of Technology

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References found in this work

Reason, truth, and history.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The problems of philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - New York: Barnes & Noble.
The philosophy of information.Luciano Floridi - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Model theory.Wilfrid Hodges - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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