A puzzle about belief updating

Synthese 190 (15):3149-3160 (2013)
Abstract
In recent decades much literature has been produced on disagreement; the puzzling conclusion being that epistemic disagreement is, for the most part, either impossible (e.g. Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976)), or at least easily resolvable (e.g. Elga (Noûs 41(3):478–502, 2007)). In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, an equally puzzling result arises: that is, disagreement cannot be rationally resolved by belief updating. I suggest a solution to the puzzle which makes use of some of the principles of Hintikka’s Socratic epistemology
Keywords Disagreement  Consensus  Epistemology of disagreement  Belief updating  Linear updating  Equal weight view  Socratic epistemology
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    References found in this work BETA
    Jaakko Hintikka & Stephen Harris (1988). On the Logic of Interrogative Inquiry. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:233 - 240.

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