David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 190 (15):3149-3160 (2013)
In recent decades much literature has been produced on disagreement; the puzzling conclusion being that epistemic disagreement is, for the most part, either impossible (e.g. Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976)), or at least easily resolvable (e.g. Elga (Noûs 41(3):478–502, 2007)). In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, an equally puzzling result arises: that is, disagreement cannot be rationally resolved by belief updating. I suggest a solution to the puzzle which makes use of some of the principles of Hintikka’s Socratic epistemology
|Keywords||Disagreement Consensus Epistemology of disagreement Belief updating Linear updating Equal weight view Socratic epistemology|
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References found in this work BETA
Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2010). The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.
Adam Elga (2007). Reflection and Disagreement. Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Jaakko Hintikka (2007). Socratic Epistemology: Explorations of Knowledge-Seeking by Questioning. Cambridge University Press.
Jaakko Hintikka & Stephen Harris (1988). On the Logic of Interrogative Inquiry. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:233 - 240.
Thomas Kelly (2005). The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oup. 167-196.
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