A paraconsistent theory of belief revision

Erkenntnis 56 (2):229 - 246 (2002)
Abstract
This paper presents a theory of belief revision that allows people to come tobelieve in contradictions. The AGM theory of belief revision takes revision,in part, to be consistency maintenance. The present theory replacesconsistency with a weaker property called coherence. In addition to herbelief set, we take a set of statements that she rejects. These two sets arecoherent if they do not overlap. On this theory, belief revision maintains coherence.
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Citations of this work BETA
Edwin D. Mares (2000). Even Dialetheists Should Hate Contradictions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):503 – 516.
Renata Wassermann (2011). On AGM for Non-Classical Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):271 - 294.
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