Belief and Introspective Knowledge in Treatise 1.3.7

Hume Studies 37 (1):99-122 (2011)
In Treatise 1.3.7 Hume offers two distinct arguments for the view that the difference between believing a matter of fact and simply conceiving of it consists in a difference in the manner of conception.1 For convenience, I will call the two arguments in Treatise 1.3.7 the “No-new-idea Argument” and the “Argument from Disagreement.” Both arguments have an eliminative structure: Hume argues against other possible accounts of belief and concludes that the only hypothesis left standing is the view that the difference between believing and conceiving is a difference in the manner of conception. He goes on to argue that since belief is a manner of conception, this manner of conception must be a function of the force and ..
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1353/hms.2011.0645
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,865
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
David Hunter (2009). Beliefs and Dispositions. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:243-262.
Dan Passell (1997). Hume's Arguments for His Sceptical Doubts. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:409-422.
John McDowell (2002). Knowledge and the Internal Revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):97-105.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2007). 'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):131-137.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

11 ( #212,898 of 1,725,153 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #134,554 of 1,725,153 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.