David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 92 (3):211-249 (1998)
According to standard, pre-philosophical intuitions, there are many composite objects in the physical universe. There is, for example, my bicycle, which is composed of various parts - wheels, handlebars, molecules, atoms, etc. Recently, a growing body of philosophical literature has concerned itself with questions about the nature of composition.1 The main question that has been raised about composition is, roughly, this: Under what circumstances do some things compose, or add up to, or form, a single object? It turns out that it is surprisingly difficult to give a satisfactory answer to this question that accords with standard, pre-philosophical intuitions about the universe's composite objects. In fact, the three rival views in response to this question that have received the most support in the literature are (i) that there are no objects composed of two or more parts (which means that there are no stars, chairs, humans, or bicycles);2 (ii) that the only objects composed of two or more parts are living organisms (which still means no stars.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Religion|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Chad Carmichael (2015). Toward a Commonsense Answer to the Special Composition Question. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):475-490.
Robert Carry Osborne (forthcoming). Debunking Rationalist Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology: An Empirical Approach. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
Ned Markosian (2015). The Right Stuff. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):665-687.
Nikk Effingham & Jon Robson (2007). A Mereological Challenge to Endurantism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):633 – 640.
Similar books and articles
Eric T. Olson (2007). What Are We?: A Study in Personal Ontology. Oxford University Press.
Ned Markosian (1998). Brutal Composition. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):211 - 249.
Ned Markosian (1998). Simples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):213 – 228.
Theodore Sider (1993). Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk. Analysis 53 (4):285 - 289.
Jacek Brzozowski (2008). 9. On Locating Composite Objects. In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press 4--193.
Kristie Lyn Miller (2006). Issues in Theoretical Diversity: Persistence, Composition, and Time. Springer.
Kris McDaniel (2010). Parts and Wholes. Philosophy Compass 5 (5):412-425.
Sara Rachel Chant (2006). The Special Composition Question in Action. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):422–441.
Uriah Kriegel (2008). Composition as a Secondary Quality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):359-383.
Ned Markosian (1998). Brutal Composition. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):211-249.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads457 ( #1,628 of 1,777,920 )
Recent downloads (6 months)234 ( #1,524 of 1,777,920 )
How can I increase my downloads?