David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 48 (1):112-121 (1981)
It is argued that the debate over the positivist theory of historical explanation has made only a limited contribution to our understanding of how historians should defend the explanations they propose importantly because both positivists and their critics tacitly accepted two assumptions. The first assumption is that if the positivist analysis of historical explanation is correct, then historians ought to attempt to defend covering laws for each of the explanations they propose. The second is that unless a historian can justify an explanation that he proposes, then his preference for that explanation is not rationally defensible. It is argued that the first assumption is false and that if in order to justify an explanation, one must justify a covering law for it, then the second assumption is also false. A program for investigating how historians should defend their explanations is suggested
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Carl Hammer (2008). Explication, Explanation, and History. History and Theory 47 (2):183–199.
Similar books and articles
Gregory Currie (1980). The Role of Normative Assumptions in Historical Explanation. Philosophy of Science 47 (3):456-473.
Paul A. Roth (2008). Varieties and Vagaries of Historical Explanation. Journal of the Philosophy of History 2 (2):214-226.
John H. Zammito (2008). A Problem of Our Own Making: Roth on Historical Explanation. Journal of the Philosophy of History 2 (2):244-249.
Sten Spam Nikon (1971). Covering Laws in Historical Practice. Inquiry 14 (1-4):445-463.
Andrew Field, Can Program Explanation Confer Ontological Rights for the Cornell Realist Variety of Moral Realism?
Mark T. Nelson (2006). Moral Realism and Program Explanation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):417 – 428.
Leon J. Goldstein (1967). Theory in History. Philosophy of Science 34 (1):23-40.
G. A. Cohen (1982). Functional Explanation, Consequence Explanation, and Marxism. Inquiry 25 (1):27 – 56.
Michael Martin (1968). Situational Logic and Covering Law Explanations in History. Inquiry 11 (1-4):388 – 399.
Andreas Frings (2007). Rationales Handeln Und Historische Erklärung. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38 (1):31 - 56.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads12 ( #127,991 of 1,101,077 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #34,406 of 1,101,077 )
How can I increase my downloads?