Concepts and Theoretical Unification

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):219-220 (2010)
This article is a commentary on Machery (2009) Doing without Concepts. Concepts are mental symbols that have semantic structure and processing structure. This approach (1) allows for different disciplines to converge on a common subject matter; (2) it promotes theoretical unification; and (3) it accommodates the varied processes that preoccupy Machery. It also avoids problems that go with his eliminativism, including the explanation of how fundamentally different types of concepts can be co-referential.
Keywords concepts  eliminativism
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 14,255
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 6 references

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Edouard Machery (2010). Précis of Doing Without Concepts. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence, Concepts. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Margolis Laurence (2010). Concepts and Theoretical Unification. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33:219-220.
D. H. Mellor (1966). Inexactness and Explanation. Philosophy of Science 33 (4):345-359.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

40 ( #67,463 of 1,700,244 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

18 ( #39,449 of 1,700,244 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.