Concepts and Theoretical Unification

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):219-220 (2010)
Abstract
This article is a commentary on Machery (2009) Doing without Concepts. Concepts are mental symbols that have semantic structure and processing structure. This approach (1) allows for different disciplines to converge on a common subject matter; (2) it promotes theoretical unification; and (3) it accommodates the varied processes that preoccupy Machery. It also avoids problems that go with his eliminativism, including the explanation of how fundamentally different types of concepts can be co-referential.
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Edouard Machery (2010). Précis of Doing Without Concepts. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence, Concepts. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Margolis Laurence (2010). Concepts and Theoretical Unification. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33:219-220.
D. H. Mellor (1966). Inexactness and Explanation. Philosophy of Science 33 (4):345-359.
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