David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):639-657 (2009)
Epistemic contextualism, many critics argue, entails that ordinary speakers are blind to the fact that knowledge claims have context-sensitive truth conditions. This attribution of blindness, critics add, seriously undermines contextualism. I show that this criticism and, in general, discussions about the error theory entailed by contextualism, greatly underestimates the complexity and diversity of the data about ordinary speakers? inter-contextual judgments, as well as the range of explanatory moves that are open to both invariantists and contextualists concerning such judgments. Contextualism does entail that some speakers suffer from semantic blindness; however, at its roots, this blindness concerns not the context-sensitivity of knowledge claims, but the question whether knowledge sentences possess context-independent truth conditions. I argue that this blindness should not be deemed problematic, but that invariantism entails an error theory that is, by comparison, much more troubling
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References found in this work BETA
John Hawthorne (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Paul Dimmock & Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes (2014). Knowledge, Conservatism, and Pragmatics. Synthese 191 (14):3239-3269.
Gregory Stoutenburg (forthcoming). Principles of Interpretive Charity and the Semantics of Knowledge Attributions. Acta Analytica:1-16.
Robin McKenna (2015). Contextualism in Epistemology. Analysis 75 (3):489-503.
André J. Abath (2012). Epistemic Contextualism, Semantic Blindness and Content Unawareness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):593 - 597.
Geoff Pynn (2015). Pragmatic Contextualism. Metaphilosophy 46 (1):26-51.
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