Can 'intrinsic' be defined using only broadly logical notions?
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):646-672 (2009)
| Abstract | An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of 'intrinsic' that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds. | |||||||||
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