Can 'intrinsic' be defined using only broadly logical notions?

Abstract
An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of 'intrinsic' that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.
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References found in this work BETA
Jaegwon Kim (1982). Psychophysical Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 41 (January):51-70.
Rae Langton & David Lewis (1998). Defining 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
David Lewis (1983). Extrinsic Properties. Philosophical Studies 44 (2):197-200.
David Lewis (1983). New Work for a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):343-377.

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