David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):155-183 (2010)
Philosophical theories about the nature of belief can be roughly classified into two groups: those that treat beliefs as occurrent mental states or episodes and those that treat beliefs as dispositions. David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature seems to contain a classic example of an occurrence theory of belief. Hume defines 'belief' as 'a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression' (Treatise 184.108.40.206 96).1 This definition suggests that believing is an occurrent mental state, such as judging, or thinking about something in a particular manner. However, at the same time, a number of Hume's readers claim to find elements in his writings that are suggestive of a dispositional account of belief.2 ..
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Hsueh Qu (2014). Hume's Positive Argument on Induction. Noûs 48 (4):595-625.
Hsueh Qu (2014). Hume's Practically Epistemic Conclusions? Philosophical Studies 170 (3):501-524.
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