Direct reference and definite descriptions

Dialectica 62 (1):43–57 (2008)
According to Donnellan the characteristic mark of a referential use of a definite description is the fact that it can be used to pick out an individual that does not satisfy the attributes in the description. Friends and foes of the referential/attributive distinction have equally dismissed that point as obviously wrong or as a sign that Donnellan’s distinction lacks semantic import. I will argue that, on a strict semantic conception of what it is for an expression to be a genuine referential device, Donnellan is right: if a use of a definite description is referential, it has got to be possible for it to refer to an object independently of any attributes associated with the description, including those that constitute its conventional meaning.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2008.01138.x
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Keith S. Donnellan (1974). Speaking of Nothing. Philosophical Review 83 (1):3-31.

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