Synthese 151 (3):561-569 (2006)
|Abstract||In this paper I examine Jaegwon Kim’s view that emergent properties are irreducible to the base properties on which they supervene. Kim’s view assumes a model of ‘functional reduction’ which he claims to be substantially different from the traditional Nagelian model. I dispute this claim and argue that the two models are only superficially different, and that on either model, properly understood, it is possible to draw a distinction between a property’s being reductively identifiable with its base property and a property’s being reductively explainable in terms of it. I propose that we should take as the distinguishing feature of emergent properties that they be truly novel properties, i.e., ontologically distinct from the ‘base’ properties which they supervene on. This only requires that emergent properties cannot be reductively identified with their base properties, not that they cannot be reductively explained in terms of them. On this conception the set of emergent properties may well include mental properties as conceived by nonreductive physicalists|
|Keywords||Emergence Explanation Physicalism Properties Reduction Science Kim, Jaegwon|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Nick Zangwill (1995). Supervenience, Reduction, and Infinite Disjunction. Philosophia 24 (3-4):321-30.
Douglas Keaton (2012). Kim's Supervenience Argument and the Nature of Total Realizers. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):243-259.
Alexander Rueger (2006). Functional Reduction and Emergence in the Physical Sciences. Synthese 151 (3):335 - 346.
Ausonio Marras (2002). Kim on Reduction. Erkenntnis 57 (2):231-57.
Neil Campbell (2010). Functional Reduction and Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 25 (4):435-446.
Sydney Shoemaker (2002). Kim on Emergence. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):53-63.
Sandra D. Mitchell (2012). Emergence: Logical, Functional and Dynamical. Synthese 185 (2):171-186.
Ausonio Marras (2005). Consciousness and Reduction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):335-361.
Max Kistler (2005). Is Functional Reduction Logical Reduction? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (14):219-234.
Rex Welshon (2002). Emergence, Supervenience, and Realization. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):39-51.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads49 ( #21,795 of 549,198 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,418 of 549,198 )
How can I increase my downloads?