David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 151 (3):561-569 (2006)
In this paper I examine Jaegwon Kim’s view that emergent properties are irreducible to the base properties on which they supervene. Kim’s view assumes a model of ‘functional reduction’ which he claims to be substantially different from the traditional Nagelian model. I dispute this claim and argue that the two models are only superficially different, and that on either model, properly understood, it is possible to draw a distinction between a property’s being reductively identifiable with its base property and a property’s being reductively explainable in terms of it. I propose that we should take as the distinguishing feature of emergent properties that they be truly novel properties, i.e., ontologically distinct from the ‘base’ properties which they supervene on. This only requires that emergent properties cannot be reductively identified with their base properties, not that they cannot be reductively explained in terms of them. On this conception the set of emergent properties may well include mental properties as conceived by nonreductive physicalists
|Keywords||Emergence Explanation Physicalism Properties Reduction Science Kim, Jaegwon|
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References found in this work BETA
Jaegwon Kim (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press.
Jaegwon Kim (1984). Concepts of Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.
Jaegwon Kim (2003). Blocking Causal Drainage and Other Maintenance Chores with Mental Causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):151 - 176.
Jaegwon Kim (1991). Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept. Metaphilosophy 21 (1-2):1-27.
Kenneth F. Schaffner (1967). Approaches to Reduction. Philosophy of Science 34 (2):137-147.
Citations of this work BETA
Richard Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard (2011). Physicalism, Emergence and Downward Causation. Axiomathes 21 (1):33-56.
David Yates (2009). Emergence, Downwards Causation and the Completeness of Physics. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):110 - 131.
Sorin Bangu (2011). On the Role of Bridge Laws in Intertheoretic Relations. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1108-1119.
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