Expressivism, Logic, Consistency, and Moral Dilemmas

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):517-533 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

On an expressivist view, ethical claims are understood as expressions of our attitudes, desires, and feelings. A famous puzzle for this view concerns the use of logic in ethical reasoning, and two standard treatments try to solve the puzzle by explaining logical inconsistency in terms of conflicting attitudes. I argue, however, that this general strategy fails: because we can reason effectively even in the presence of conflicting moral attitudes – in cases of moral dilemmas – avoiding these conflicts cannot be a ground for correct moral reasoning. The result is a dilemma for expressivists: if they take all kinds of attitudes to be under consideration, then conflict cannot play the required role, since attitudes can fail to be compatible in cases of moral conflict. If they restrict attention to ‘all-in attitudes’ or to intentions or plans, then there is an important notion of obligation, used in standard arguments – one for which conflicts are allowed – that they fail to capture. I explain why expressivists should be especially tolerant of conflicting attitudes, and I conclude that they should pursue a different strategy for grounding logical normativity.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino.Carl Baker - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):445-455.
Moral Dilemmas and Consistency in Ethics.Terrance C. McConnell - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):269 - 287.
Moral dilemmas.Shyam Nair - 2015 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The definition of moral dilemmas: A logical problem. [REVIEW]Jurriaan De Haan - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):267-284.
“Two Types of Moral Dilemmas”.Peter Vallentyne - 1989 - Erkenntnis 30 (3):301-318.
Expressivism, deflationism and correspondence.Patricia Marino - 2005 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 2 (2):171-191.
Irreconcilable Differences.Erin Taylor - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):181-192.
Moral dilemmas and consistency.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):121-136.
Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists.Toby Svoboda - 2015 - New Content is Available for Journal of Moral Philosophy (1):48-72.
Expressivism, Subjectivism and Moral Disagreement.Sebastian Köhler - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):71-78.
Elaborating Expressivism: Moral judgments, Desires and Motivation.John Eriksson - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):253-267.
Ethics, Logical Consistency and Practical Deliberation.Nancy Matchett - 2011 - Theoretical and Applied Ethics 1 (3).

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
71 (#209,912)

6 months
2 (#668,348)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Patricia Marino
University of Waterloo

Citations of this work

On essentially conflicting desires.Patricia Marino - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):274-291.
Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino.Carl Baker - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):445-455.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Rogers Searle - 1969 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Thinking how to live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.

View all 34 references / Add more references