David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 150 (1):99-129 (2006)
In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about object-identity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are token identical to physical events: A particular mental event m is identical with a particular physical event p only if there is a sortal S such that m and p are both Ss. If there is no such sortal, the doctrine of token-identity is not true. I argue here that we have no good reason for thinking that there is any such sortal.
|Keywords||MENTAL CAUSATION PHYSICAL OBJECT IDENTITY CONSTITUTION XU|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Jaegwon Kim (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press.
Jaegwon Kim (1993). Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957/2000). Intention. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Eric Marcus (2005). Mental Causation in a Physical World. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):27-50.
Rachel Goodman (2012). Why and How Not to Be a Sortalist About Thought. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):77-112.
Stephen Maitzen (2012). Stop Asking Why There's Anything. Erkenntnis 77 (1):51-63.
Martin Lipscomb (2010). Events and Event Identity: Under-Explored Topics in Nursing. Nursing Philosophy 11 (2):88-99.
Similar books and articles
Markus E. Schlosser (2009). Non-Reductive Physicalism, Mental Causation and the Nature of Actions. In H. Leitgeb & A. Hieke (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain. Ontos
Bruce Goldberg (1977). A Problem with Anomalous Monism. Philosophical Studies 32 (August):175-80.
E. J. Lowe (2007). Sortals and the Individuation of Objects. Mind and Language 22 (5):514–533.
Hong Yu Wong (2005). The Metaphysics of Emergence. Noûs 39 (4):658 - 678.
Christopher D. Green & Grant R. Gillett (1995). Are Mental Events Preceded by Their Physical Causes? Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):333-340.
Tim Crane (2004). Summary of Elements of Mind and Replies to Critics. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):223-240.
Terence E. Horgan & Michael Tye (1985). Against the Token Identity Theory. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell
Thomas Kroedel (2008). Mental Causation as Multiple Causation. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):125-143.
Brandon Carey (2010). Overdetermination And The Exclusion Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):251-262.
Tyler Burge (1993). Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads60 ( #60,842 of 1,781,456 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #108,213 of 1,781,456 )
How can I increase my downloads?