David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 150 (1):99-129 (2006)
In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about object-identity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are token identical to physical events: A particular mental event m is identical with a particular physical event p only if there is a sortal S such that m and p are both Ss. If there is no such sortal, the doctrine of token-identity is not true. I argue here that we have no good reason for thinking that there is any such sortal
|Keywords||MENTAL CAUSATION PHYSICAL OBJECT IDENTITY CONSTITUTION XU|
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Citations of this work BETA
Eric Marcus (2005). Mental Causation in a Physical World. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):27-50.
Stephen Maitzen (2012). Stop Asking Why There's Anything. Erkenntnis 77 (1):51-63.
Rachel Goodman (2012). Why and How Not to Be a Sortalist About Thought. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):77-112.
Martin Lipscomb (2010). Events and Event Identity: Under-Explored Topics in Nursing. Nursing Philosophy 11 (2):88-99.
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