Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||There are obvious differences between (1) Mary is talking to the Dean and (2) Mary is looking for the Dean. In (1) we can replace "the Dean" by any other coextensional term and preserve truth value; also, from (1) we can infer that there is someone Mary is talking to. Such behavior breaks down in (2): neither intersubstitution of coextensional terms nor existential generalization guarantee preservation of truth value in a sentence like (2). (1) is purely extensional; (2) is intensional.|
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