Francisco Varela's view on phenomenology in his cognitive interpretation

The philosophy by Husserl has always been a very interesting topic for cognitive scientists. Indeed, there is a strong analogy between the method of phenomenological reduction and the theories of mind developed by cognitive science in the last fifty years. The method of reduction is based on the concept of reality as a product of mind. Cognitive science seems to agree with this view but it is still difficult to elaborate a cognitive interpretation of the Husserl phenomenology which is philosophically correct. The best attempt is that by Francisco Varela; thanks to the philosophic teaching of Humberto Maturana, he offers us a terribly reliable and audacious interpretation of Husserl even if complex for the role which plays between two necessities: the former is to construct neurophenomenology emphasizing the philosophy of Husserl like the only conceptual architecture able to study experience directly and the latter (which) is to found the enactive paradigm for cognitive science referring to Buddhist psychology.
Keywords philosophy of mind  cognitive neuroscience  phenomenology  consciousness  neurophenomenology
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