Hopes and Dreams

It is a commonplace in both the popular imagination and the philosophical literature that hope has a special kind of motivational force. This commonplace underwrites the conviction that hope alone is capable of bolstering us in despairinducing circumstances, as well as the strategy of appealing to hope in the political realm. In section 1, I argue that, to the contrary, hope’s motivational essence is not special or unique—it is simply that of an endorsed desire. The commonplace is not entirely mistaken, however, because standard ways of expressing hope do have motivational influence that is different in kind from that of desire. In sections 2 through 4, I examine one of these ways of expressing hope, fantasizing, and argue that fantasies can present us with reasons to modify our goals and projects in multiple ways
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DOI 10.2307/23035360
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.

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Citations of this work BETA
Aaron D. Cobb (2015). Hope as an Intellectual Virtue? Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):269-285.
Uriah Kriegel (2013). Understanding Conative Phenomenology: Lessons From Ricœur. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):537-557.

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