Intuitionism and conservatism

Metaphilosophy 21 (3):282-293 (1990)
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Abstract

I define ethical intuitionism as the view that it is appropriate to appeal to inferentially unsupported moral beliefs in the course of moral reasoning. I mention four common objections to this view, including the view that all such appeals to intuition make ethical theory politically and noetically conservative. I defend intuitionism from versions of this criticism expressed by R.B. Brandt, R.M. Hare and Richard Miller.

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Mark T. Nelson
Westmont College

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