It's a Colorful World

American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):71 - 80 (2006)
Abstract
‘It’s a Colorful World’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 43:1, pp. 71-80, 2006. Abstract: I defend the intuition that the phenomenology of our experience is right in attributing the colors we see to objects; but although colors are properties of objects, they are constitutively dependent on the perceiver’s experiences. I offer a metaphysical account for this primitivist intuition, in response to David Chalmers’ arguments against it, drawing inspiration from Aristotle’s theory of causation.
Keywords Perception, realism, phenomenal properties
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