Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):321-339 (2006)
|Abstract||There has been much written in recent years about whether a pair of subjects could have visual experiences that represented the colors of objects in their environment in precisely the same way, despite differing significantly in what it was like to undergo them, differing that is, in their qualitative character. The possibility of spectrum inversion has been so much debated1 in large part because of the threat that it would pose to the more general doctrine of Intentionalism, according to which the representational content of an experience fixes what it|
|Keywords||Epistemology Intentionalism Inversion Representationalism Spectrum Symmetry Thought Experiment|
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