Intentionalism and the imaginability of the inverted spectrum

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):321-339 (2006)
Abstract
There has been much written in recent years about whether a pair of subjects could have visual experiences that represented the colors of objects in their environment in precisely the same way, despite differing significantly in what it was like to undergo them, differing that is, in their qualitative character. The possibility of spectrum inversion has been so much debated1 in large part because of the threat that it would pose to the more general doctrine of Intentionalism, according to which the representational content of an experience fixes what it
Keywords Epistemology  Intentionalism  Inversion  Representationalism  Spectrum  Symmetry  Thought Experiment
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References found in this work BETA
Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199 - 240.
Eric Marcus (2004). Why Zombies Are Inconceivable. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):477-90.
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