Imperative content and the painfulness of pain

Abstract
Representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness have problems in accounting for pain, for at least two reasons. First of all, the negative affective phenomenology of pain (its painfulness) does not seem to be representational at all. Secondly, pain experiences are not transparent to introspection in the way perceptions are. This is reflected, e.g. in the fact that we do not acknowledge pain hallucinations. In this paper, I defend that representationalism has the potential to overcome these objections. Defenders of representationalism have tried to analyse every kind of phenomenal character in terms of indicative contents. But there is another possibility: Affective phenomenology, in fact, depends on imperative representational content. This provides a satisfactory solution to the aforementioned difficulties
Keywords Philosophy of Mind  Pain  Representationalism
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References found in this work BETA
Fred Dretske (2003). Experience as Representation. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):67-82.

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Citations of this work BETA
David Bain (2013). What Makes Pains Unpleasant? Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
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