David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 165 (2):693-718 (2013)
This paper takes a fresh look at the nativism–empiricism debate, presenting and defending a nativist perspective on the mind. Empiricism is often taken to be the default view both in philosophy and in cognitive science. This paper argues, on the contrary, that there should be no presumption in favor of empiricism (or nativism), but that the existing evidence suggests that nativism is the most promising framework for the scientific study of the mind. Our case on behalf of nativism has four parts. (1) We characterize nativism’s core commitments relative to the contemporary debate between empiricists and nativists, (2) we present the positive case for nativism in terms of two central nativist arguments (the poverty of the stimulus argument and the argument from animals), (3) we respond to a number of influential objections to nativist theories, and (4) we explain the nativist approach to the conceptual system
|Keywords||Nativism Empiricism Innate Learning Domain-specificity|
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (2008). Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Susan Carey (2009). The Origin of Concepts. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Simon Fitzpatrick (2015). Nativism, Empiricism, and Ockham’s Razor. Erkenntnis 80 (5):895-922.
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