Informal proofs and mathematical rigour

Studia Logica 96 (2):261-272 (2010)
The aim of this paper is to provide epistemic reasons for investigating the notions of informal rigour and informal provability. I argue that the standard view of mathematical proof and rigour yields an implausible account of mathematical knowledge, and falls short of explaining the success of mathematical practice. I conclude that careful consideration of mathematical practice urges us to pursue a theory of informal provability
Keywords mathematical proof  mathematical rigour  foundations  formalisation  formal method
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DOI 10.2307/40927692
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References found in this work BETA
Y. Rav (1999). Why Do We Prove Theorems? Philosophia Mathematica 7 (1):5-41.

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Y. Rav (1999). Why Do We Prove Theorems? Philosophia Mathematica 7 (1):5-41.
Edwin Coleman (2009). The Surveyability of Long Proofs. Foundations of Science 14 (1-2):27-43.

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