Incomprehensibility: The role of the concept in DSM-IV definition of schizophrenic delusions

Abstract
In this paper the role of incomprehensibility in the conceptualization of the DSM-IV definition of delusion is discussed. According to the analysis, the conceptual dependence of DSM-IV definition of delusion on incomprehensibility is manifested in several ways and infested with ambiguity. Definition of bizarre delusions is contradictory and gives room for two incompatible readings. Also the definition of delusion manifests internal inconsistencies and its tendency to account for delusions in terms of misinterpretation is bound to miss the content of the traditional comprehension of delusionality. It is suggested that the ambiguities in defining delusions has to do with the question whether psychiatric practice is better accounted for in terms of the grammar of incorrectness or of incomprehensibility
Keywords bizarre delusion  conceptual analysis  definition of delusions  DSM-IV  incomprehensibility  philosophy of psychiatry  schizophrenic delusions
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Citations of this work BETA
Mads Gram Henriksen (2013). On Incomprehensibility in Schizophrenia. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):105-129.
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Mads Gram Henriksen (2013). On Incomprehensibility in Schizophrenia. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):105-129.
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Andrew W. Young (1999). Delusions. The Monist 82 (4):571-589.
Leslie Forman & Wendy Wakefield Davis (1994). Dsm-IV Meets Philosophy. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (3):207-218.
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