David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 66 (3):305 - 327 (2007)
The aim of this paper is to show that Kim’s ‚supervenience argument’ is at best inconclusive and so fails to provide an adequate challenge to nonreductive physicalism. I shall argue, first, that Kim’s argument rests on assumptions that the nonreductive physicalist is entitled to regard as question-begging; second, that even if those assumptions are granted, it is not clear that irreducible mental causes fail to␣satisfy them; and, third, that since the argument has the overall structure of a reductio, which of its various premises one performs the reductio on remains open to debate in an interesting way. I shall finally suggest that the issue of reductive vs. nonreductive physicalism is best contested not in the arena of mental causation but in that in which the issues pertaining to theory and property reduction are currently being debated.
|Keywords||Kim nonreductive physicalism supervenience mental causation|
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References found in this work BETA
Jaegwon Kim (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
Jaegwon Kim (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press.
Jaegwon Kim (1993). Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Citations of this work BETA
Steven French (2008). More Worry and Less Love? Metascience 17 (1):1-26.
Jeff Engelhardt (2012). Varieties of Multiple Antecedent Cause. Acta Analytica 27 (3):231-246.
Lei Zhong (2015). Why the Counterfactualist Should Still Worry About Downward Causation. Erkenntnis 80 (1):159-171.
Michael Esfeld (2010). Causal Overdetermination for Humeans? Metaphysica 11 (2):99-104.
Dwayne Moore (2012). Causal Exclusion and Dependent Overdetermination. Erkenntnis 76 (3):319-335.
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