Locke and Arnauld on Judgment and Proposition

History and Philosophy of Logic 29 (4):327-341 (2008)
To understand pre-Fregean theories of judgment and proposition, such as those found in Locke and the Port-Royal logic, it is important to distinguish between propositions in the modern sense and propositions in the pre-Fregean sense. By making this distinction it becomes clear that these pre-Fregean theories cannot be meant to solve the propositional attitude problem. Notwithstanding this fact, Locke and Arnauld are able to make a distinction between asserted and unasserted propositions (in their sense). The way Locke makes this distinction turns out to be very different from the way it is made by Arnauld
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DOI 10.1080/01445340801976532
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