Looking for the Lazy Argument Candidates

Organon F 18 (3 & 4):363-383; 447-474 (2011)
Abstract
The Lazy Argument, as it is preserved in historical testimonies, is not logically conclusive. In this form, it appears to have been proposed in favor of part-time fatalism (including past time fatalism). The argument assumes that free will assumption is unacceptable from the standpoint of the logical fatalist but plausible for some of the nonuniversal or part-time fatalists. There are indications that the layout of argument is not genuine, but taken over from a Megarian source and later transformed. The genuine form of the argument seems to be given in different form and far closer to Megarian logical fatalism and its purpose is not to defend laziness. If the historical argument has to lead to a logically satisfactory solution, some additional assumptions and additional tuning is needed.
Keywords logical determinism  fatalism  Megarian
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Vladimir Marko, Looking for the Lazy Argument Candidates
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Susan Haack (1974). On a Theological Argument for Fatalism. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (95):156-159.
Nicola Ciprotti (2012). Metaphysical Fatalism, in Five Steps. Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):35-54.
Ned Markosian (1995). The Open Past. Philosophical Studies 79 (1):95 - 105.
Robert C. Solomon (2003). On Fate and Fatalism. Philosophy East and West 53 (4):435-454.
Joseph Diekemper (2004). Temporal Necessity and Logical Fatalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):287–294.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-11-13

Total downloads

85 ( #13,990 of 1,096,953 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

19 ( #6,607 of 1,096,953 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.