David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 26 (5):507-539 (2011)
In LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Jerry Fodor argues that concept learning of any kind—even for complex concepts—is simply impossible. In order to avoid the conclusion that all concepts, primitive and complex, are innate, he argues that concept acquisition depends on purely noncognitive biological processes. In this paper, we show (1) that Fodor fails to establish that concept learning is impossible, (2) that his own biological account of concept acquisition is unworkable, and (3) that there are in fact many promising general models for explaining how concepts are learned
|Keywords||learning concept acquisition Fodor conceptual development|
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References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1969). The Individuation of Events. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Reidel. 216-34.
Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (2008). Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1981). The Present Status of the Innateness Controversy. In Jerry Fodor (ed.), Representations. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (2013). In Defense of Nativism. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):693-718.
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