Lewis' strawman

Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):55-65 (2002)
In a survey of his views in the philosophy of mind, David Lewis criticizes much recent work in the field by attacking an imaginary opponent, Strawman. His case against Strawman focuses on four central theses which Lewis takes to be widely accepted among contemporary philosophers of mind. These theses concerns (1) the language of thought hypothesis and its relation to folk psychology, (2) narrow content, (3) de se content, and (4) rationality. We respond to Lewis, arguing (among other things) that he underestimates Strawman’s theoretical resources in a variety of important ways.
Keywords David Lewis  Language of thought  narrow content  de se content  rationality  folk psychology
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    Ned Block (1986). Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-78.

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