Models and the Semantic View

Philosophy of Science 73 (5):524-535 (2006)
I begin by distinguishing two notions of model, the notion of a truth-making structure and the notion of a mathematical model (in one specific sense). I then argue that although the models of the semantic view have often been taken to be both truth-making structures and mathematical models, this is in part due to a failure to distinguish between two ways of truth-making; in fact, the talk of truth-making is best excised from the view altogether. The result is a version of the semantic view which is better supported by the direct evidence offered for it, better equipped to achieve its avowed aims, and, I think, closer to the intentions of the original proponents of the view in many ways, despite some of their own declarations to the contrary.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/518322
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Joseph R. Shoenfield (1967). Mathematical Logic. Reading, Mass.,Addison-Wesley Pub. Co..

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Tim Crane (2015). The Mental States of Persons and Their Brains. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:253-270.
Chris Pincock (2007). Mathematical Idealization. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):957-967.
Christopher Pincock (2007). Mathematical Idealization. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):957-967.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

65 ( #52,478 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

12 ( #56,980 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.