Moral dilemmas and consistency

Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):121-136 (1980)
Abstract
Marcus argues that moral dilemmas are real, but that they are not the result of inconsistent moral principles. Moral principles are consistent just in case there is some world where all principles are 'obeyable.' They are inconsistent just in case there is no world where all are 'obeyable.' What this logical point is meant to show is that moral dilemmas do not make moral codes inconsistent. She also discusses guilt, and argues that guilt is still appropriate even in cases of conflict, even when the agent thinks the right thing to do is clear
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Peter B. M. Vranas (2007). I Ought, Therefore I Can. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167 - 216.
Bart Streumer (2007). Reasons and Impossibility. Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.

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