Meaning, Truth, and Phenomenology

Metaphilosophy 31 (4):412-426 (2000)
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Abstract

This essay approaches Derrida through a consideration of his writings on Saussure and Husserl. Derrida is right to insist, following Saussure, on a relational theory of meaning: words do not have a one-to-one correspondence with their referents. But he is wrong to insist on a purely differential theory of meaning: words can refer to reality within the context of a body of knowledge. Similarly, Derrida is right to reject Husserl's idea of presence: no truths are simply given to consciousness. But he is wrong to reject the very idea of objective knowledge: we can defend a notion of objective knowledge couched in terms of a comparison of rival bodies of theories. The essay concludes by considering the implications of the preceding arguments for the enterprise of phenomenology.

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References found in this work

Ideas: general introdution to pure phenomenology.Edmund Husserl - 1931 - New York,: The Macmillan company. Edited by William Ralph Boyce Gibson.
Methodological Pragmatism.N. Rescher - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (2):185-188.
Objectivity in History.Mark Bevir - 1994 - History and Theory 33 (3):328-344.

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