Nonreductive materialism and the problem of causal exclusion

Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):79-88 (2002)
In this paper I examine nonreductive materialism (physicalism). This is a position that Terry Horgan favors in his papers and is probably the most widely accepted position in the philosophy of mind in recent decades. In contrast to this, I will argue that nonreductive materialism is an unstable position and will suggest that we can show this using Horgan's own work on the concept of superdupervenience.
Keywords Causation  Materialism  Horgan, T
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Olga Markič (2004). Causal Emergentism. Acta Analytica 19 (33):65-81.

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