Nonreductive materialism and mental causation

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):465-93 (1994)
The aim of this paper is to defend a version of nonreductive materialism against the epiphenomenalist objection to which Davidson's anomalous monism has often been held to be vulnerable. After considering a number of options for dealing with the objection, I argue that an appeal to the notion of strong supervenience (properly explicated) can both rebut a common form of the "property" ("type") epiphenomenalist objection and provide a grounding for the causal relevance ("efficacy") of mental properties
Keywords Causation  Counterfactual  Logic  Materialism  Mental  Truth
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Sophie Gibb (2006). Why Davidson is Not a Property Epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.
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