Nonreductive materialism and mental causation

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):465-93 (1994)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to defend a version of nonreductive materialism against the epiphenomenalist objection to which Davidson's anomalous monism has often been held to be vulnerable. After considering a number of options for dealing with the objection, I argue that an appeal to the notion of strong supervenience (properly explicated) can both rebut a common form of the "property" ("type") epiphenomenalist objection and provide a grounding for the causal relevance ("efficacy") of mental properties

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Citations of this work

Kim’s Principle of Explanatory Exclusion.Ausonio Marras - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):439-451.
Why Davidson is not a property epiphenomenalist.Sophie Gibb - 2006 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.
Interventions on causal exclusion.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):255-263.
Mental causation and the paradoxes of explanation.Karsten R. Stueber - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (3):243-77.
The problem of mental causation and the nature of properties.S. C. Gibb - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):464-75.

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References found in this work

Making mind matter more.Jerry A. Fodor - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (11):59-79.
Epiphenomenal and supervenient causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):257-70.
Mind matters.Ernest Lepore & Barry Loewer - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (November):630-642.
Making mind matter more.Jerry Fodor - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (11):642.

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