On a fallacy attributed to tarski

History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (4):227-234 (1998)
The purpose of this paper is to examine some passages of Tarski?s paper ?On the concept of logical consequence? and to show that some recent readings of those passages are wrong. John Etchemendy has claimed that in those passages Tarski gave an argument purporting to show that the notion of logical consequence defined by him (as opposed to some pretheoretic notion of logical consequence) possesses certain modal properties. Etchemendy further claims that the argument he attributes to Tarski is fallacious. Some of Etchemendy?s critics have granted him that Tarski did give an argument purporting to show that the defined notion possesses certain modal properties ; but they have claimed that Tarski?s argument was not a fallacious one. I will show that both Etchemendy and his critics are wrong; in the relevant passages, Tarski did not offer (nor did he intend to offer) an argument that the defined notion of logical consequence possesses any modal properties
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DOI 10.1080/01445349808837312
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References found in this work BETA
John Etchemendy (1983). The Doctrine of Logic as Form. Linguistics and Philosophy 6 (3):319 - 334.

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Citations of this work BETA
Alfred Tarski (2002). On the Concept of Following Logically. History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (3):155-196.

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