|Abstract||Until recently, Rawlsian orthodoxy held that John Rawls’ ideal theory of justice as fairness can be straightforwardly extended to nonideal social conditions. A. John Simmons has demonstrated this view to be false. Rawls lacks any analysis of transitional fairness. Simmons, however, is skeptical about the possibility of constructing a comprehensive theory of transitional fairness. I show that such a theory is possible by beginning a project that Rawls once suggested: systematically extending his “original position” to nonideal theory. I construct a nonideal theoretic original position on the basis of Rawls’ arguments, showing how the parties to it ought to prioritize a special class of “nonideal theoretic primary goods” over Rawls’ principles and priority relations. Finally, I show that the parties should agree to a general principle which distributes these goods to the maximum advantage of the most oppressed.|
|Keywords||justice nonideal theory fairness Rawls ideal theory|
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|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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