On Putnam's critique of metaphysical realism: Mind-body identity and supervenience

Synthese 126 (3):407-426 (2001)
  As part of his ongoing critique of metaphysical realism, Hilary Putnam has recently argued that current materialist theories of mind that locate mental phenomena in the brain can make no sense of the proposed identifications of mental states with physical (or physical cum computational) states, or of the supervenience of mental properties with physical properties. The aim of this paper is to undermine Putnam's objections and reassert the intelligibility – and perhaps the plausibility – of some form of mind-body identity and supervenience
Keywords Materialism  Metaphysics  Mind  Realism  Reductionism  Supervenience  Putnam, H
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