Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Non-Reductive Materialism

D (1977)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Persons and Minds is an inquiry into the possibilities of materialism. Professor Margolis starts his investigation, however, with a critique of the range of contemporary materialist theories, and does not find them viable. None of them, he argues, "can accommodate in a convincing way the most distinctive features of the mental life of men and oflower creatures and the imaginative possibilities of discovery and technology" (p. 8). In an extraordinarily rich analysis, Margolis carefully considers and criticizes mind-body identity theories, physicalism, eliminative materialism, behaviorism, as inadequate precisely in that they are reductive. He argues, then, for ramified concepts of emergence, and embodiment which will sustain a philosophically coherent account both of the distinctive non-natural character of persons and of their being naturally embodied. But Margolis provokes us to ask, what is an em bodied mind? The crucial context for him is not the plain physical body as such, but culture. "Persons", he writes, "are in a sense not natural entities: they exist only in cultural contexts and are identifiable as such only by refer ence to their mastery of language and of whatever further abilities presuppose such mastery" (p. 245). The hallmark of persons, in Margolis's account, is their capacity for freedom, as well as their physical endowment. Thus he writes, " . . . their characteristic powers - in effect, their freedom - must inform the order of purely physical causes in a distinctive way" (p. 246).

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,656

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Non-personal minds.Stephen R. L. Clark - 2003 - In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 185-209.
Can physicalism be non-reductive?Andrew Melnyk - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1281-1296.
Materialism and the first person.Geoffrey Madell - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 123-139.
The myth of non-reductive materialism.Jaegwon Kim - 1989 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63 (3):31-47.
Materialism and disembodied minds.B. L. Blose - 1981 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (September):59-74.
Mind, Paranormal Experience, and the Inadequacy of Materialism.L. Stafford Betty - 2004 - International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):373-392.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
41 (#339,996)

6 months
1 (#1,042,085)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Joseph Margolis
Last affiliation: Temple University

Citations of this work

Good-bye behaviorism!John Limber - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4):581-583.
On Elder-Vass: Refining a refinement.Douglas Porpora - 2007 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37 (2):195–200.
Being a physicalist: How and (more importantly) why.Andrew Melnyk - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 74 (2):221-241.
Alleged problems in attributing beliefs, and intentionality, to animals.Richard Routley - 1981 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):385-417.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references