Psychophysical supervenience and nonreductive materialism

Synthese 95 (2):275-304 (1993)
Abstract
  Jaegwon Kim and others have claimed that (strong) psychophysical supervenience entails the reducibility of mental properties to physical properties. I argue that this claim is unwarranted with respect to epistemic (explanatory) reducibility (either of a global or of a local sort), as well as with respect to ontological reducibility. I then attempt to show that a robust version of nonreductive materialism (which I call supervenient token-physicalism) can be defended against the charge that nonreductive materialism leads to epiphenomenalism in failing to account for the causal or explanatory relevance of mental properties
Keywords Epistemology  Global  Maternalism  Ontology  Supervenience  Kim, J
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DOI 10.1007/BF01064591
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References found in this work BETA
John Haugeland (1978). The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2):215-26.
Jaegwon Kim (1984). Concepts of Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.
Rudolf Carnap (1936). Testability and Meaning. Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.

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Citations of this work BETA
Brian J. Garrett (2000). Defending Non-Epiphenomenal Event Dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):393-412.

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