David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:173-214 (2002)
A long-standing theme in discussion of perception and thought has been that our primary cognitive contact with individual objects and events in the world derives from our perceptual contact with them. When I look at a duck in front of me, I am not merely presented with the fact that there is at least one duck in the area, rather I seem to be presented with this thing in front of me, which looks to me to be a duck. Furthermore, such a perception would seem to put me in a position not merely to make the existential judgment that there is some duck or other present, but rather to make a singular, demonstrative judgment, that that is a duck. My grounds for an existential judgment in this case derives from my apprehension of the demonstrative thought and not vice versa
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References found in this work BETA
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Simon Blackburn (1984). Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press.
Michael G. F. Martin (2002). The Transparency of Experience. Mind and Language 4 (4):376-425.
Citations of this work BETA
Bence Nanay (2012). Perceiving Tropes. Erkenntnis 77 (1):1-14.
Christopher Buford (2013). Centering on Demonstrative Thought. Philosophia 41 (4):1135-1147.
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